While most governments pledge to guarantee protection from external aggression, they often cannot provide adequate internal security.

In Kenya, as in many other countries, the void has been taken over by criminal gangs, especially in urban slums, and private security companies.

This is what the Kenya government finds itself in as it grapples urban crime. In the opinion of many slum-dwellers, the police are generally slow, inept, corrupt and unlikely to properly investigate crime for successful prosecution.

According to the 2010 Global Corruption Barometer Report, at least 92 per cent of Kenyans perceive the police force as the most corrupt institution of the state.

Fifty-nine per cent of respondents said that either they or a member of their household had paid a bribe to the police.

Most poor people in urban slums live on the margins of the law, characterised by unlawful take over of houses, failure to pay taxes and the illegal tapping of water and electricity, among others.

The government has been unable to adequately provide these services to slum residents, who pay gangs for such basics.

They also turn to the gangs for justice, law and order.

Absence of government

Gangs now provide security by filling the void created by the absence of government.

As such, violence has been ‘democratised,’ ceasing to be the preserve of the powerful or the police.

However, policing in the ‘informal state’ involves overlapping agencies providing security, depending on the time of day, social status of those involved and the economic activity they are engaged in.

The formally employed are most likely to encounter police officers or private guards securing commercial buildings.

Commuters encounter gangs who control bus terminals and the matatu industry.

Residents of middle and upper class neighbourhoods pay private guards to secure their homes, while slum-dwellers rely on gangs for security.

In a day, a citizen can encounter both formal and informal policing. Informal policing, however, takes place mostly outside the regulatory framework of the state.

Its actors include gangs and private security companies that bring the otherwise absent public good of security to situations where state organs are largely absent.

Informal policing has its share of critics and supporters alike. Some scholars have associated informal policing with ‘gangsterism’, ‘warlordism’, terrorism, radicalisation, ignorance and abuse of basic human rights.

Others have argued that informal policing is not only popular in the absence of regular police, but it has been proven to actually work. In some areas, it has been anchored in the local traditional systems of governance.

Informal security networks, especially in slums, are a complex web of linkages of different groups that include gangs, youth groups and vigilantes.

Scholars have widely accepted several characteristics of gangs. It is generally agreed that gangs can be defined by their ability to organise as a group with clear names and symbols, and by having a clear territory in which they exert their power.

They mostly have a shared ethnic, race or age group identity. Members view themselves as a gang and are recognised by others as such. Gangs are also said to be involved increased criminal activity.

Most people view gangs as a group of young people with negative attributes, operating illegally and engaged in predatory practices like extortion, violence and human rights abuses.

Some scholars have even suggested that what sets gangs apart from other youth groups is their routine association with violence, which the wider society sees as inherent to gangs.

This however ignores the fact that gangs are the product of particular social and political settings.

The physical deterioration of poor neighbourhoods has a spiralling effect on social control within these areas, and provides a fertile environment for crime and other deviant behaviours, and also for the rise of gangs. In addition, gangs can also play positive roles, for example by reducing crime levels and campaigning against drug abuse, prostitution and other negative social phenomena.

Thus, in attempting to understand the operation of gangs in Kibera and Mathare, one needs to look at the complex relationship between the individual members of the gangs, their behaviour and their influence over economic and social change in the areas where they operate.

Violence is not the only defining characteristic of gangs. There are other factors that complete the picture of why they are able to operate between legality and illegality, legitimacy and illegitimacy.

Snapshots of gangs in Kenya

In March 2000, the Commissioner of Police outlawed nearly two dozen gangs across the country. This did not stop them from operating, however.

In August 2010, the government enacted the Prevention of Organised Crimes Act which outlines strategies to address organised crime.

A month later, 33 gangs operating in various parts of Kenya were outlawed. Ironically, these included some of the groups that were banned in 2000.

However, banning or outlawing the gangs did not stop them from operating as they are informally organised and hard to disband.

Moreover, the institutionalisation of violence and impunity in society has also contributed to the continued existence of these groups.

Some of their leaders and sponsors, though publicly known, have never been prosecuted, giving them a sense of comfort.

More fundamental is that the government has not taken measures to address reasons why gangs exist, the lack of economic and job opportunities.

The gangs play different roles in Kenyan society. When respondents were asked in a November 2010 national survey what activities gangs engage in, 48 per cent said they collect illegal taxes, while 42 per cent cited violence.

Another 14 per cent said they provide services and 22 per cent said they offer security in return for payment.

When asked who they would rely on to protect them between the police and gangs, 75 per cent preferred the police while 19 per cent said it is important for both the gangs and police to protect them.

In another 2010 survey by the World Bank, residents of Korogocho slum in Nairobi were asked to name three groups that are doing a good job in reducing crime and violence.

Fifty-six per cent named vigilante groups. The Kenya Police were ranked fifth with only 5 per cent of responses.

Thus, whereas the majority of respondents would rather have the police providing security, there are those who would opt to have them share this duty with the gangs.

It therefore emerges that police are not the only recognised security providers.

Although citizens would prefer to rely on a trustworthy police force for protection, they sometimes have to rely on gangs due to the inefficiency and lack of legitimacy of the force.

The 2010 Kenya Police Crime Report notes that threats to national security are primarily posed by organised criminal gangs.

The Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security also notes that the emergence of gangs poses a significant threat to peace.

Regrettably, police responses to gangs and gang-related violence has sometimes led to extrajudicial killings of youth suspected to be members of the outlawed groups.

According to the UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial executions, “killings by police in Kenya are systematic, widespread and carefully planned. They are committed at will and with utter impunity”.

However, many Kenyans support heavy handed police tactics and argue that it is the only way to handle crime and the proliferation of gangs.

A lack of trust and faith in the criminal justice system has led to these high approval ratings for extra-judicial executions.

Nevertheless, the killings have not translated into reduced crime or elimination of gangs.

In fact the Kenya Police acknowledges that it has inadequate resources and personnel to effectively tackle crime and organised gangs.

The police-citizen ratio in Kenya stands at 1:850, which falls below the recommended United Nations ratio of 1:450.

The force also suffers severe shortages vehicles, equipment and technology; while officers are overwhelmed by the wide range of duties.

Like other informal settlements in Nairobi, Kibera and Mathare slums are characterised by high population density, unplanned and crowded housing and a lack of infrastructure.

Most roads are inaccessible to vehicles, drainage canals are often blocked and heaps of garbage stand everywhere.

Crime is a big problem, and many residents resort to the informal policing offered by gangs.

Gangs operating in Kibera include Siafu, 12 Disciples, Kamukunji Pressure Group, Military, Yes We Can, Mungiki, J-10 and Debunchers.

All of these operate in Laini Saba and Katwekera areas in the slum but each has its territory within these areas. In Mathare 3C and Kosovo areas, the most prominent groups are the Taliban and Mungiki.

Different ethnic groups

Despite the different names, their mode of operation is similar and they share many features. For example, most gang members interviewed said the groups are made up of young people.

In addition, one has to pay a registration fee, which varies from group to group, to join. Ethnicity is not necessarily a criterion for enrolment in the gangs and their members are from different ethnic groups.

All the gangs have leaders who are usually the founders. Whenever there are unresolved disagreements, the aggrieved parties often break away and start their own group in a different area.

Two gangs rarely operate in the same area, as each jealously guards its turf. Though banned, all of them still organise people to attend political rallies in their areas and provide security at the venue.

They also regularly take part in crime and extortion, but also solve disputes and provide utility services like illegal water and electricity connections.

The gangs install illegal connections without meters to tap into the main water and power supply lines.

A minimum of Sh3 is charged for a 20-litre gallon of water, but this increases in the event of a water shortage.

For illegal power connections, the gangs charge between Sh300 to Sh1,000, depending on the size of the house, paid once after connection.

Water and electricity companies disconnect the illegal supplies, sometimes leading to violence in the slums with the gangs joining forces to chase away officials carrying out the disconnections.

Gangs in Kibera and Mathare charge a security fee of Sh100-Sh200 per month depending on whether one occupies a permanent or semi-permanent house.

Businesses pay Sh300-Sh500 depending on size. Tourists and filmmakers pay a one-off flat fee of Sh5,000.

The fees are non-negotiable and paid on demand. Failure to pay results in harassment and makes it impossible to live in the area or operate a business.

It is thus arguable that by providing and charging for security, these gangs have altered the nature of state power at the local level. They have blurred the boundaries between the state and criminal gangs.

In slums the gangs are ‘the government’ and charge ‘taxes’ through extortion or protection fees. The state no longer commands the monopoly of force.

The gangs have evolved new modes of operation and organisation with far-reaching consequences for economic and social welfare. Nevertheless, the relationship between the community and the gangs is complicated.

According to a gang member, they have a love-hate relationship with the community, which is also symbiotic.

The gangs benefit from the community by being given a safe haven when police are pursuing them.

They are also tolerated and given space to conduct their activities since they are not outsiders; they are the children of the community, born and raised there and are products of the environment they have grown in.

Unemployment, idleness, poverty and lack of opportunities have led to crime and violence in the informal settlements.

Residents therefore tend to empathise with the gangs and to blame the government for not doing enough to create jobs.

Police kill gang members

In turn, the community gets security and other services which the government has failed to provide. However, the gangs also thrive because of the fear they instil.

An ambiguous relationship exists between the gangs, police and provincial administration. At times the police kill gang members, which serves as a daily reminder that the state is not entirely absent and that it is also powerful.

Gang members have been used as police informers, in the long run establishing a system of mutual tolerance, co-existence and co-operation in solving crimes.

However, police also have been known to protect the gangs when they commit crimes since they may receive proceeds of extortion.

Residents of Kibera and Mathare report crime to both the police and the gangs, depending on its seriousness. Murder and rape are considered serious crimes and are reported directly to the police.

Petty crimes like muggings, theft, housebreaking, fights, illicit alcohol and domestic violence are reported to the gangs.

According to a Kibera resident, they do not report petty crimes to the police “since they will not solve them or recover stolen goods”.

If a suspected criminal is apprehended, the gangs may choose to hand him over to the police or subject him to mob justice.

Other forms of punishment include banishing the suspect if he or she comes from the community. By doing this, the social relations between the gang and the community are enhanced.

Part of the reason Mathare and Kibera residents prefer handing over suspects to gangs is to discourage suspected criminals from taking revenge.

Secondly, gangs are trusted to protect the identity of witnesses, unlike the police who sometimes betray informers.

The other reason citizens will hand suspects over to gangs is because of the generally high level of mistrust the public have of the police, which is reinforced by high levels of police corruption.

This results in a loss of public trust in the police and a blurring of the line between the police and the gangs.

Since citizens refer to gangs to solve problems, this might suggest a good social relationship between gangs and the community.

However, the relationship is more complicated than this. On the one hand, the gangs are violent and will most likely resort to violence to solve problems.

Hence, they are a source of violence and criminal actions. On the other hand, they have a reputation of solving problems more quickly and efficiently than the police.

Since gang members are also inhabitants of the slums, they are often considered to be part of the community. The linkages between the informal and formal state, however, are complex.

Importantly, therefore, Kenya must adopt a model for addressing security needs that suit local conditions, while at the same time undertaking security sector reforms.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has recognised that the reform of the justice and security sectors requires a multi-layered approach that provides assistance to a wide range of legitimate state and non-state actors.

Legitimate security machinery

This will give people a chance to build on local resources and knowledge in security provision.

It will offer an opportunity to untangle the complex linkages between the invisible and visible state, leading to the formation of a strong state that is able to provide national and human security.

In addition, forming linkages with non-state actors will strengthen the state’s legitimacy in ensuring people are safe, since all providers would be seen as an integral cog in the legitimate security machinery.

However, this needs to be done hand in hand with police reforms, which need to build on a framework based on principles of accountability.

Clear standards should be established and appropriate sanctions put in place for those who transgress. Already, the government has started implementing security sector reforms.

Parliament has approved the National Police Service Bill which will set the stage for a replacement of the entire police leadership.

However, no major reform has been undertaken. Attitudinal change among the police and political commitment are required for comprehensive police reforms.

Considering the role that gangs play in slums, it is necessary that security reforms take note of the operations of informal policing.

This might mean incorporating their good elements and utilising the already existing network to strengthen formal security structures.

Disbanding the gangs without providing adequate measures to fill the security gap will not solve crime in slums.

Patrick Mutahi is a Fellow at the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies in Kenya where he works on policy issues relating to human rights, governance, urban crime and security.